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- Kobe Philosophy Seminar Series(21): Ways of Perceiving (2026年10月8日（木））
2026.9.24(木)
Kobe Philosophy Seminar Series(21): Ways of Perceiving (2026年10月8日（木））
Kobe Philosophy Seminar Series(21): Ways of Perceiving
Naive realism is a contemporary relationalist view which holds that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is constitutively dependent on the mind-independent objects and properties with which the subject is acquainted (Campbell 2002; Martin 2004; Fish 2009; Soteriou 2013; Kim 2022; 2024). An ongoing debate concerns whether naive realism entails diaphaneity, the claim that phenomenal differences are exhaustively explained by differences in presented objects and properties (Travis 2004; Zieba 2022; Sethi 2024; 2025). Diaphaneity-affirming naive realism faces difficulty accounting for cases in which the same object can look different under changing conditions while being experienced as the same persisting object with stable properties. A coin, for example, looks elliptical when viewed obliquely while still being experienced as circular throughout. Recent appeals to different 'ways of perceiving' address this problem but leave the nature of a way of perceiving unspecified (French & Phillips 2020; 2025). I develop a positive account of ways of perceiving as structural features of the manner in which the subject-object relation is itself organised. Drawing on phenomenological accounts of the interplay of anticipation and fulfilment (Husserl 1939/1973; 1966/2001), I argue how this (non-diaphanous) structure explains both variation with constancy and perceptual indeterminacy within a single framework.
Contact: Takuya niikawa (niikawa@ferret.kobe-u.ac.jp)
This workshop is supported by Project Innovation Ethics, KOBELSI and KAKENHI grant number 25K24749
Date: 8 October 2026
Time: 17:00-18:30
Place: B133, Graduate School of Humanities, Kobe University
Speaker: Daniel Kim (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
17:00-18:30 Daniel Kim "Ways of Perceiving"
Naive realism is a contemporary relationalist view which holds that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is constitutively dependent on the mind-independent objects and properties with which the subject is acquainted (Campbell 2002; Martin 2004; Fish 2009; Soteriou 2013; Kim 2022; 2024). An ongoing debate concerns whether naive realism entails diaphaneity, the claim that phenomenal differences are exhaustively explained by differences in presented objects and properties (Travis 2004; Zieba 2022; Sethi 2024; 2025). Diaphaneity-affirming naive realism faces difficulty accounting for cases in which the same object can look different under changing conditions while being experienced as the same persisting object with stable properties. A coin, for example, looks elliptical when viewed obliquely while still being experienced as circular throughout. Recent appeals to different 'ways of perceiving' address this problem but leave the nature of a way of perceiving unspecified (French & Phillips 2020; 2025). I develop a positive account of ways of perceiving as structural features of the manner in which the subject-object relation is itself organised. Drawing on phenomenological accounts of the interplay of anticipation and fulfilment (Husserl 1939/1973; 1966/2001), I argue how this (non-diaphanous) structure explains both variation with constancy and perceptual indeterminacy within a single framework.
Contact: Takuya niikawa (niikawa@ferret.kobe-u.ac.jp)
This workshop is supported by Project Innovation Ethics, KOBELSI and KAKENHI grant number 25K24749